US Nuclear Weapons Policy

US Nuclear weapons Policy rests on the concept of deterrence- utilizing the US Nuclear Weapons Arsenal as a tool to dissuade other states from acting a in a way counter to US interests. This is different from the Cold War deterrent where the US nuclear weapons arsenal existed solely to deter a first strike by the Soviets or China. The following are a few quote on deterrence from the United States Joint Nuclear Operations plan from March 2005

“Strategic deterrence is defined as the prevention of adversary aggression or coercion that threatens vital interests of the United States and/or our national survival.  Strategic deterrence convinces adversaries not to take grievous courses of action by means of decisive influence over their decision making.”

“The focus of US deterrence efforts is therefore to influence potential adversaries to withhold actions intended to harm US’ national interests.”

“The US does not make positive statements defining the circumstances under which it would use nuclear weapons.” It went on to say that if the US clearly listed these circumstances it would embolden the enemy by telling them the things they could do and still avoid a nuclear strike. If the US never defines them, however, the enemy must be more careful, because they can never be sure if their actions would result in a nuclear strike"

“Real force capabilities, US national determination to use them, and a potential adversary’s perception of both the capabilities and the will to use them contribute to the effectiveness deterrence.”

The following quotes are from page VIII

Under international reaction the paper says “no customary or conventional international law prohibits nations from employing nuclear weapons in armed conflict and under the law of armed conflict “no customary or conventional international law prohibits nations from employing nuclear weapons in armed conflict.” followed by “The law of armed conflict does not prohibit nuclear weapons use in armed conflict’ although they are unique from conventional and even other WMD in the scope of their destructive potential and long-term effects." page IX

Under the Cold Wart concept of deterrence, clarity was a necessity. If the opposition was unsure of the response, deterrence wouldn't work. This shift is the meaning of deterrence is very very important. It moves our nuclear arsenal from something existing solely to prevent a nuclear attack on a US city to one that threatens other states with a form of nuclear blackmail---do not cross the US because you never know what we might do. Proponents of the Nuclear Posture Review defend it by saying that in the end its a political decision and its highly unlikely any US President would make that choice. In reality,the US has used nuclear weapons. The US as also had individuals in the government with less of a bias against nuclear weapons use. As we shift our forces to a new post-Cold War posture, the blending of US advanced conventional and US nuclear forces blurs the line between the two. Yes, our leaders may decided to use an advanced conventional weapon instead of a nuclear one. But couldn't the opposite be true as well?

Nuclear Posture Review of 2002 is the philosophical underpinning of the US Joint Nuclear Plan. It listed two main goals for the US arsenal:

1.Reduce the nuclear arsenal

2. Move to a capabilities based force with operationally deployed 'Active Nuclear Forces' of about 2200 and 'Responsive Nuclear Forces' of about 4000 stored for use as needed. This is the part of the provisions listed in the Moscow Treaty.

The NPR listed seven states as possible targets of a nuclear attack: China, Russia, Iraq, North Korea, Syria, Iran and Libya. The three scenarios for using a nuclear weapons were:

1. Against targets able to withstand a nuclear attack

2. In retaliation for a nuclear, chemical, or biological attack

3. In the case of a surprising military development- to end a war more quickly (see Hiroshima and Nagasaki)

In order to integrate nuclear weapons and advanced conventional weapons, the US Nuclear Triad was changed. The Nuclear Triad during the Cold War was Land, Sea and Air platforms for nuclear weapons. The goal of this triad was to ensure enough of the US nuclear weapons arsenal survived a first strike that it could effectively retaliate against the aggressor- so it could be an effective deterrent. The goal of this shift is to:

1. Assure friends

2. Dissuade potential enemies from acquiring WMD

3. Deter those that have them

4. Defeat any adversary

The new triad looks like this:

• Offensive forces: old triad plus sophisticated conventional weapons.  Argument about what effect this will have military vs civilian, political effects- RNEP
• Defensive forces: Missile defense (shield as defense vs offense)
• Responsive Infrastructure: facilities to build new nuclear weapons, increasing/decreasing arsenal as necessary, u pit facilities, upgrading command control intelligence capabilities to respond to emerging threats.

We as a country should begin to have a discussion about what purpose WE want our nuclear weapons to serve and if they still serve a purpose in the post Cold War world where our biggest threat- Non-State Actors- cannot be deterred from using nuclear weapons by the US nuclear weapons arsenal.