US Nonproliferation Policy
US Nonproliferation Policy is laid out the most clearly in the 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction available on the State Department's web site. In it, Nonproliferation is part of a 'three pillar' approach to combating the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, biological weapons, delivery systems and related materials. The goals of US Nonproliferation policy are to:
In order to accomplish this, the US plans to use active diplomacy, multilateral regimes, and unilateral actions to control nuclear materials. The Bush administration hopes active diplomacy can dissuade states from acquiring a WMD capability or prevent states from assisting others in their quest to acquire such a capability. The key feature of this is holding states accountable for their actions. As most states are signatories of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, most of the international community technically must abide by its provisions to refrain from developing nuclear weapons or helping others develop this capability. In practice this is a trickier situation as private individuals and companies have in recent years provided assistance or duel use technology to states seeking weapons. Addressing citizens or corporations proliferating WMD related technology is a matter for the legal system more than the military. The challenge here is convincing states to write strict laws against proliferation and implement them when presented with proof their citizens are breaking the law. In the case of a State actor, if they are outside the relevant treaties, there is little the international community can do. A great example of this is Pakistan. It is unclear how much the Pakistani government knew about A. Q. Khan's efforts to spread nuclear weapons and technology. Either way, Pakistan is outside of the NPT and asserting too much pressure may be counterproductive to other US policy goals. Therefore, the US must make a decision about which goal is more important- nonproliferation or terrorism- and create a way to address them both.
The US is attempting to strengthen multilateral regimes and ensure states comply, but the more it pressures non-nuclear weapons states to increase regulations on their use of nuclear technology, the more resentment enters into the policy debate. As previously mentioned, many Non Nuclear Weapons States feel the US and other nuclear weapons states have no intention of disarming and therefore are violating the NPT themselves.
The US has had tremendous success with the Cooperative Threat Reduction program and other international in initiatives to bring nuclear materials under control, but there is still much work to do. The US has said it is willing to negotiate a Fissile Material Control Treaty, but progress ont his treaty is slow. Their policy appears to adhere to the double standard that allies are allowed to have a closed fuel cycle and enrich uranium, but states who disagree to the US cannot. From a purely nationalistic point of view this makes sense, but in terms of nonproliferation, all fissile material is a threat an effective solution addressing this threat needs to be presented.
The US would like to see export controls strengthened and the use of sanctions increased, but unless these are implemented on a near universal basis, they will ultimately prove ineffective. The Iraq sanctions worked for precisely that reason- all the key states agreed on the need to prevent Saddam Hussein from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.
US Counterproliferation Policy
Counterproliferation differs from nonproliferation in that it involves the use of the military to prevent proliferation and respond once proliferation has occurred. It emphasizes concrete action apart from or in relation to international organizations. The Bush Administration’s Counterproliferation policy includes the Proliferation Security Initiative, Container Security, Missile Defense, and the development of equipment to counter the use of nuclear, chemical, biological, or radiological devices. Counterproliferation has received more emphasis than nonproliferation under President Bush due to this administration’s emphasis on enforcement and unilateralism over diplomacy and international organizations. On this page I have summarized the two most talked about policies, the Proliferation Security initiative and Global Missile Defense.
The Proliferation Security Initiative
The PSI is an activity, not an organization. The emphasis placed on this leads to its categorization as counterproliferation. It is designed to allow the US and its ‘coalition of the willing’ to fill a gap in the nonproliferation regime and enforce nonproliferation treaties. ‘Members’ of the PSI are countries that have agreed to participate in PSI related activities and agree to the set of interdiction principles governing the group’s actions. They are as follows:
"PSI participants are committed to the following interdiction principles to establish a more coordinated and effective basis through which to impede and stop shipments of WMD, delivery systems, and related materials flowing to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern, consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks, including the UN Security Council. They call on all states concerned with this threat to international peace and security to join in similarly committing to:
1) Undertake effective measures, either alone or in concert with other states, for interdicting the transfer or transport of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. ’States or non-state actors of proliferation concern’ generally refers to those countries or entities that the PSI participants involved establish should be subject to interdiction activities because they are engaged in proliferation through: (1) efforts to develop or acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems; or (2) transfers (either selling, receiving, or facilitating) of WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials.
2) Adopt streamlined procedures for rapid exchange of relevant information concerning suspected proliferation activity, protecting the confidential character of classified information provided by other states as part of this initiative, dedicate appropriate resources and efforts to interdiction operations and capabilities, and maximize coordination among participants in interdiction efforts.
3) Review and work to strengthen their relevant national legal authorities where necessary to accomplish these objectives, and work to strengthen when necessary relevant international law and frameworks in appropriate ways to support these commitments.
4) Take specific actions in support of interdiction efforts regarding cargoes of WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials, to the extent their national legal authorities permit and consistent with their obligations under international law and frameworks, to include:
a Not to transport or assist in the transport of any such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, and not to allow any persons subject to their jurisdiction to do so.
b At their own initiative, or at the request and good cause shown by another state, to take action to board and search any vessel flying their flag in their internal waters or territorial seas, or areas beyond the territorial seas of any other state, that is reasonably suspected of transporting such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, and to seize such cargoes that are identified.
c To seriously consider providing consent under the appropriate circumstances to the boarding and searching of its own flag vessels by other states, and to the seizure of such WMD-related cargoes in such vessels that may be identified by such states.
d To take appropriate actions to (1) stop and/or search in their internal waters, territorial seas, or contiguous zones (when declared) vessels that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes to or from states or non- state actors of proliferation concern and to seize such cargoes that are identified; and (2) to enforce conditions on vessels entering or leaving their ports, internal waters or territorial seas that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes, such as requiring that such vessels be subject to boarding, search, and seizure of such cargoes prior to entry.
e At their own initiative or upon the request and good cause shown by another state, to (a) require aircraft that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern and that are transiting their airspace to land for inspection and seize any such cargoes that are identified; and/or (b) deny aircraft reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes transit rights through their airspace in advance of such flights.
f If their ports, airfields, or other facilities are used as transshipment points for shipment of such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, to inspect vessels, aircraft, or other modes of transport reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes, and to seize such cargoes that are identified.” (this statement was taken from the State Department website http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/fs/23764.htm)
These principles expanded upon the ideas presented by President Bush in May 2003. Since then the PSI has grown to include over 60 countries and several countries have signed Ship Boarding Agreements allowing PSI members states to board ships flying the flag.
Global Missile Defense (GMD) and Theater Missile Defense (THAD)
Missile Defense can trace its origins back to the Sentinel Missile Defense system of the 1960s. It didn’t work very well, but provided at least an allusion of protection for some American cities and missile silos. The Soviets deployed their own version to protect Moscow, though its efficacy is doubtful as well. Missile Defense systems were banned under the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) of 1972. This treaty placed boundaries on the Star Wars program implemented under President Reagan in the 1980s. Despite a large budget, the project never succeeded in developing an effective system. Under Clinton, funds were cut dramatically and the program lay dormant. After the current President Bush was elected, many of the same individuals pushing missile defense under Reagan returned to office and once again sought to make Missile Defense a reality. The ABM Treaty remained as a hindrance to these efforts, so President Bush withdrew from the treaty in 2001.
Proponents of Missile Defense argue the US must be able to defend itself from attack against a rogue nation immune to the traditional idea of deterrence that worked during the Cold War with the Soviets. They also argue such a system will be invaluable to defending US troops and allies from attack. Opponents of the system argue it will hurt US security by inspiring our adversaries to build more missiles so an attack will be sure to overwhelm our shield, as well as more sophisticated missiles designed to trick the system and allow the missiles through. Furthermore, the program is incredibly expensive and has yet to prove its viability.