Like any subject, nonproliferation and arms control has their own terminology. Understanding the lingo will help you better understand the policy related articles.

Arms Control: Explicit or implicit international agreements that governs the numbers, types, characteristics, deployment, and employment or particular armed forces and armaments (from Collins, John M. "Military Strategy: Principles, Practices and Historical Perspectives." U.S.A: Brassey, 2002. p.293.) For the purposes of this website, it will refer to treaties dealing with ballistic missiles as well as nuclear, chemical and biological weapons arsenals.

Counterproliferation: preventing the spread of a particular weapon through military means. It also includes preparing ones forces to fight against a particular weapon. In this context, using the military to prevent the spread of nuclear, chemical, or biological weaponry and preparing the military so it can defend against these weapons. Some definitions will not make a distinction between military and non-military means.

First Tier Proliferation: technology or material sold or stolen from private companies or state nuclear programs assists nonnuclear weapons states in developing illegal nuclear weapons programs and delivery systems. (from Braun, Chaim and Christopher F. Chyba "Proliferation Rings: New Challenges to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime" International Security Vol. 29, No.2 (Fall 2004) p.5)

Latent Proliferation: a country adheres to, or at least for some time maintains the facade of adhering to, its formal obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) while nevertheless developing the capabilities needed for a nuclear weapons program. (from Braun, Chaim and Christopher F. Chyba "Proliferation Rings: New Challenges to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime"International Security Vol. 29, No.2 (Fall 2004) p.5)

Nonproliferation: means preventing the spread of something. In this case, it refers to preventing the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weaponry.

Nuclear Weapon: the weaponization of highly enriched uranium (HEU), weapons grade uranium, or weapons grade plutonium for use against an enemy.

Radiological Dispersal Device: placing radiological material with high explosives so that when the explosive detonates, the radiological material will be spread over an area. The size of the contaminated area will vary depending on the size of the explosion. The degree of contamination will vary depending on the radiological material used.& nbsp; Initial casualties will be caused by the explosion. Later on people who receive a sufficient dosage of radiation will suffer health effects. What is considered a sufficient dosage depends on the material. The explosion will look like it was caused by a conventional bomb, but once radiation is discovered the area will need to be decontaminated. The main effect will be panic and economic costs.

Second Tier Proliferation: states in the developing world with varying technical capabilities trade among themselves to bolster one another's nuclear and strategic weapons efforts. (from Braun, Chaim and Christopher F. Chyba "Proliferation Rings: New Challenges to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime" International Security Vol. 29, No.2 (Fall 2004) p.5)

Weapon of Mass Destruction: term often used to describe nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. This term can be misleading, because the destruction to human life and/or property varies considerable depending on which weapon is under discussion, how effectively it was designed, and how it was deployed. Nuclear weapons cause the most damage, where as high explosives can kill more people in an initial attack than many chemical or biological weapons. For a chemical weapon to kill large numbers of people, it must be dispersed effectively in sufficient quantities over a large group of defenseless people. In the case of biological agents it depends on the lethality of the agent, its method of dispersal, how well it is spread from victim to victim, how rapidly it is identified and whether or not there is effective treatment for the number of people infected. This is a general definition and varies depending on the government or organization asked.

Weaponized: putting the material (chemical, nuclear, biological) into a form in which it can be used as a weapon. For example a state or non-state actor may have a slurry of anthrax, but unless they can figure out a way to disperse it over the enemy in such a way as the people are infected, it will not work as a weapon.

During the second half of the 1960s, world leaders became concerned with the growing number of states possessing nuclear weapons as well as those with active development programs. They decided it was in the best interest of the world community to sign a treaty preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The result of their efforts, though short compared to most other treaties at 13 articles long, seeks to do a number of important things. First it seeks to limit the number of states legitimately possessing nuclear weapons to those states that exploded nuclear weapons before January 1, 1967. Second, it grants all states the right to access nuclear technology provided they do not use the knowledge for weapons programs. Third, it calls on all members to completely disarm. These three things, nonproliferation, disarmament, and the right to peaceful use of nuclear technology are often referred to as the three pillars of the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

Five states fit the criteria to join as Nuclear Weapons States, however, some chose to remain outside the treaty and instead chose to share nuclear technology with other states regardless of the proliferation risk. NWS within the treaty shared nuclear technology as well, however, under the provisions regulating the transfer of nuclear technology and materials, there was a lessened chance of proliferation. When China and France acceded to the treaty, they were allowed to keep their nuclear weapons arsenals

Several states outside the treaty, Argentina, Brazil, India, Pakistan and South Africa, went on to develop nuclear weapons. Three of these states later dismantled their nuclear weapons programs, however, India and Pakistan still retain their arsenals. Should these states wish to join the NPT, they would need to disarm. This angers many developing countries as they see the tolerance displayed towards the NWS arsenals in contrast to the disarmament standard applied to states possessing nuclear weapons outside the treaty. Two other states, Israel and North Korea, are ambiguous cases. It is likely that they have nuclear arsenals, however, there is still some debate within the policy community over this issue. Many Newly Independent States (former Soviet Republics) inherited nuclear weapons or nuclear industrial facilities from the USSR and decided to accept the offers of financial assistance offered to them by the international community in exchange for becoming NNWS.

The treaty is reviewed on a five-year cycle with four separate conferences: three preparatory conferences and a review conference. The first two decide procedural issues, the third introduces more substantive issues as the format of the conference and subsidiary bodies are determined, and the fourth conference reviews substantive issues related to the treaty. This series of conferences is different from the review process followed in the first few decades of the regime, however, it allows states to better discuss the changing nature of the proliferation problem.

The first two conferences generally proceed more smoothly than the final two, as they do not discuss substantive issues. From April 26th to May 7th 2004, the 2004 NPT Preparatory Conference was held in New York City at the UN to prepare a text suggesting topics to be discussed at the 2005 Review Conference. From the beginning it was clear the conference would be a difficult one as different factions began to organize with each one promoting different priorities as well as positions on the issues under discussion.

The first issue of contention concerns disarmament.& nbsp; Much of the world believes the U.S. and the other NWS are not fulfilling their part of the bargain by disarming at a reasonably rapid pace. NWS provide a variety of responses to this accusation, the most popular being that they are disarming as fast as is prudent given the current security environment and the difficult steps involved in safely dismantling nuclear warheads.

The second major issue of contention was access to nuclear material and technology. Much of the developing world believes the peaceful uses of nuclear technology is a right guaranteed in the treaty and an important tool in development. Furthermore, they see the attempts by the NWS and their allies to limit nuclear access as discriminatory, especially in light of the slow progress made in disarming. They argue it is unacceptable for the developing world to depend on the industrialized countries of the world for their nuclear energy needs and that this dependence limits their freedom of action in the international community. The NWS and their allies argue NNWS forfeit their right to access nuclear technology if they are unable to satisfactorily prove they do not have a nuclear weapons program.

A third issue of contention is security assurances made by NWS that they will refrain from using nuclear weapons against a NNWS. Some Nuclear Weapons States contend they have already provided adequate security assurances to NNWS, however, NNWS would like to see a set of legally binding negative and positive security assurances agreed to by the five nuclear weapons states. Negative security assurances guarantee a state will not be attacked by nuclear weapons and a positive security assurance promises that other states will aide in the injured parties defense and retaliate on their behalf. Only one NWS, China, currently has a no first use policy and the NNWS are pressing the other NWS to follow China lead.

The Biological Weapons Convention, which opened for signature in 1972 and entered into force in 1975, bans the development, production, stockpile, and transfer of biological weapons. It was negotiated, because most state governments believed these weapons were too unpredictable and possessed too great a capability to indiscriminately harm a civilian population in war. Furthermore, the effects caused by biological weaponry often take days to manifest themselves so they do not provide immediate assistance to battlefield operations.

Delegations from the United States and the Soviet Union lead the negotiations and eventually 144 other states signed the treaty. It is important to note that while the treaty bans the production, transfer and stockpile of these weapons, it does not explicitly forbid their use, only referring to the text of the Geneva Protocol. It allows for bio-defense programs, though the difference between offensive and defensive programs are sometimes difficult to determine. Should a state believe another state is in violation of the agreement, it can contact the United Nations Security Council and call for an investigation, however, the permanent five retain their veto power and can block the request. Even after the UNSC decides to investigate, the treaty does not specify the responsibilities of the investigators or the state under inspection. Lastly, as the treaty did not include any verification measures, it falls on the intelligence agencies of individual states to make sure everyone abides by the agreement.

As the threat of terrorism increased, states realized the BWC no longer adequately met the need of the international community, To address the existing problems, such as a lack of verification measures, the parties to the convention authorized the forming of an Ad Hoc Group in 1995. They conducted negotiations for six and a half years, an effort that ended in a draft additional protocol to be added to the treaty. It called on stats to declare specific activities and any relevant facilities. Inspectors from a new international organization created specifically to enforce the treaty provisions would then investigate these sites. Any accusations of noncompliance would be addressed to this new organization that would then launch an investigation. To further aide the progress, the obligations of the inspectors and the state in question are specified in the document and other states are allowed to consult in the investigation. The designers of the protocol realized their plan would not verify compliance with complete certainty, but rather their intent was to make it harder and more costly to hide offensive bio-weapons programs. Perhaps the most important part of the new provisions was its status as legally binding, so states could enforce the terms of the agreements.

The Clinton Administration favored the protocol, however, the Bush Administration response was decidedly negative. They had three main complaints about the protocol. First, it could not effectively deter other states from violating the BWC. Second, the protocol could override state export controls. Lastly, it puts U.S. bio-defense and bio-industry trade secrets at risk. Currently the Ad Hoc Committee continues to hold meetings and discuss the issues until the state parties to the convention meet in 2006. The Bush administration proposed alternatives to the protocol suggested by the Ad Hoc Committee, however the Bush Proposal fails to make the Convention easier to enforce.

The Chemical Weapons Convention opened for signature in 1993 and entered into force in 1997. It defines a chemical weapons agent as any chemical that causes death or injury to people and animals. Under this agreement states parties may not develop, produce, stockpile, transfer or use chemical weapons as well as lend assistance to other states so they can engage in behavior prohibited by the treaty. States who possess these weapons must destroy all existing stockpiles and production facilities within ten years of the convention's entry into force. Also, riot control agents fall under the definition of chemical weapons so states are forbidden to use them in war. Unlike the BWC, the CWC has an effective declaration and inspection regiment implemented by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. This treaty came about due to the interest in arms control and disarmament prevalent in the late 1980s and the Soviet Union& rsquo;s desire to stop the continued production of these weapons by the U.S.

Signatories to the convention are complying, however, neither Russia nor the U.S. will meet the 2007 deadline for the destruction of their stockpiles. Disposing of these munitions is very hazardous and people living nearby are extremely critical of the method chose, burning the chemicals so the area around the facilities is exposed to smoke containing the root chemicals of the weapons. Thus far there are no reports of injury caused by exposure to these fumes, however, it is impossible to know the long-term effects on the surrounding population.& nbsp; Russia faces the same environmental and political problems, but also is unable to afford all the necessary equipment.

These weapons have proven useful on the battlefield and are easier to develop than nuclear or biological weapons so smaller countries continue to show an interest in their development. Most of the equipment needed for chemical weapons programs is considered duel-use technology so it is relatively easy to acquire. Frequently, states are motivated to produce chemical weapons in response to the stockpile of a rival or to threaten their weaker neighbors. Perhaps of greater concern than the proliferation by states, is the potential for terrorists to develop chemical weapons. Of the three types of WMD, this is the easiest for a non-state actor to produce, though effective dispersal is still a formidable challenge.